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Of all commodies money is the most fungible.
Consequently, the price of money-which is the
rate of inflation - and the price of credit
(money's liability counterpart) which is mea-
sured by interest rates-"tend" to similar val~es
across domestic and international boundanes.
With the increasing integration of domestic and
international money and capital markets, it is
unusual to see financial assets with similar risk
characteristics trading at different interest yields
for any length of time. A related, but different,
result of money's fungibility is the fact that cen-
tral bank monetary actions in one country can
affect the money supply in another country un-
der a system of imperfectly flexible exchange
rates.
This article will outline some of the monetary
interconnections among nations and specify in
a simple fashion the results of these interrela-
tions. We will first consider the degree of cor-
relation among short - term interest rates of
several countries. Next we will describe the com-
position of foreign monetary bases, and the con-
nection of this composition to the monetary
theory of the balance of payments. Finally-:e
will consider the degtee of impact of changes III
the U.S. monetary base on changes in foreign
money supplies, along with estimates of the de-
mand for monetary-base money.
*1 wish to thank Scott Nason for his research assistance.
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Some obvious interdependencies
The rapid rise and integration of capital and
money markets in the postwar period, combined
with the spectacular growth of the Eurocurrency
market since the early 1960's, have led to inter-
related movements among financial assets of like
maturity and risk elements. Table 1 presents a
simple correlation matrix for the pcriod 1959..1
to 1973.4, depicting the correlations among van-
out types of short-term interest rates-Treasury
bill rates for eight countries as well as the three-
month Eurodollar rate. The interest rates used
are quarterly averages. In most cases we see
very high correlation between foreign interest
rates and the interest rate on U.S. Treasury bills.
As we might expect, changes in U.S. and Cana-
dian interest rates are highly correlated, but
changes in U.S. and U.K rates are equally highly
correlated and the same is only slightly less true
for rates in the U.S. and Germany.
There are a number of reasons for this close
correlation. The most important is that in a
world of relatively free capital markets assets
denominated in different currencies serve as po-
tential substitutes in the portfolios of private
wealth-holders. In addition, countries may be
pursuing similar monetary policies, which result
in similar impacts on market-determined interest
rates. Indeed, the balance of payments repre-
sents, in one definition, the change in a nation's
international reserves, and domestic monetary
policies are often undertaken in response toComposition of foreign monetary base
dollar liabilities to foreign official institutions
from $17 billion in 1968 to $71 billion in 1974.
Because foreign-exchange reserves represent a
major component of the monetary bases of for-
eign central banks, foreign money supplies nec-
essarily had to expand, except where central
banks could offset inflows of foreign-exchange
reserves.
changes in the balance of payments. The pre-
dominant reasons for this interrelationship
among international interest rates include the
growth of international capital markets and the
relaxation of constraints on capital flows. In
cases where governments have instituted domes-
tic impediments to capital flows, international
offsets to these impediments have then arisen,
viz., the Eurocurrency market.
In addition to the interest-rate correlation,
price indices also are correlated internationally. The money supply is similarly defined in this
Because other countries formerly pegged their and most other countries. In the U.S., the nar-
exchange rates to the dollar (within narrow rowly defined money supply (M1 ) is composed
bonds), any significant U.S. balance-of-pay- of currency and coin plus demand deposits held
ments deficits-caused, say, by an increase in by the public. In the U.K, the M1 money supply
price inflation within the U.S·-had to result in is composed of notes and coin plus sterling cur-
other countries purchasing dollars in the foreign- rent accounts held by the public. However, the
exchange markets. But, as we shall see below, assets of the respective central banks-the Fed-
such purchases of dollars added to the foreign- eral Reserve and the Bank of England-which
exchange reserves of foreign central banks. support the reserves held by the commercial
Table 2 displays the rapid upswing in official for- banks, are different in one important respect.
eign-exchange holdings of eleven developed na- The principal foreign component of this mone-
tions between 1968 and 1974. Germany and tary base in the U.S. is the gold stock, while in
Japan, with their rapid real economic growth, the U.K. and other foreign countries the central
experienced large demands for real money bal- bank's holdings of foreign assets make up a
ances, which were at least partially satisfied significant share of the sources of the monetary
through the accumulation of foreign-exchange base. Since the money supply used by the pub-
reserves. The share of domestic money demand lic is "supported" by the central bank's monetary
satisfied from foreign sources in a regime offixed base, control of the monetary base is essential if
exchange rates depends upon the growth in the a country is to control its money supply and its
world money supply. (See the companion article rate of inflation.
by Shaw for details.) The U.S., as the major This simple point provides a monetary con-
source of international reserves increased its nection through the balance of payments to other
Table 1
Correlation Matrix
for Change in Eurodollar Rate and Treasury 8ii1 Rate of Various Countries
United United Nether-
States Kingdom Canada Italy Germany Japan Australia lands Euro
United States 1.000000
United Kingdom .801860 1.000000
Canada .788500 .599957 1.000000
Italy .471451 .395329 .122251 1.000000
Germany .645567 .545940 .299815 .632305 1.000000
Japan .334773 .200238 .624185 -.104926 .295214 1.000000
Australia .389175 .501618 .164727 .638102 .700282 .364275 1.000000
Netherlands .670903 .690429 .608011 .350920 .686181 .691753 .719916 1.000000
Euro .923835 .717829 .711332 .537490 .682429 .318161 .518629 .704486 1.000000
Note: Euro is the3-month Euro-dollarrate. All otherfigures are theTreasurybill rates forthecountry indicated.
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Table 2
Official Foreign Exchange Reserve Holdings
and U.S. Official liabilities
(Billions of U.S. Dollars: End of Period)
countries. Consider the assets of a foreign cen-
tral bank, composed of domestic assets (e.g.,
government securities, loans to commercial
banks) and foreign assets-which are counter-
balanced by central bank liabilities, the equiva-
lent in the U.S. of member-bank reserves, in
some countries called "central bank money."
Hence we have
6Foreign
Country c Assets 9 R2 D.W.
U.K. 126.06 -1.1307 .4844 .8533 2.26
(2.30)* (-8.79) (3.03)
Canada .1486 -1.0466 .5703 .8808 2.09
(3.77) (-15.1) (2.80)
Italy 315.17 -.60699 .2336 .2498 2.11
(5.61) (-2.65) (1.32)
Germany 1.0256 -.5906 .0784 .5823 1.98
(1.64) (-6.46) (.431)
Japan 626.97 -.87039 .9446 .9673 1.94
(2.03) (-24.6) (15.8)
France 2.1286 -.86465 -.3929 .2493 1.90
(3.19) (-3.58) (-2.34)
Australia .090681 -.98522 .4475 .8943 2.04
(3.13) (-14.7) (2.74)
Netherlands .08310 -.80451 -.5542 .8099 1.66
(1.48) (-9.59) (-3.65)
Sweden .19822 -.87293 -.2509 .9099 1.82
(7.98) (-19.2) (-1.42)
Norway .12940 -1.0010 -.2394 .7372 2.18
(3.03) (-8.59) (-1.35)





Sample Period = 1966·1 - 1973·IV
where 6. represents the incremental change in
each variable. 6. R represents the change in a
country's holdings of foreign-exchange reserves
and corresponds to one definition of the balance
of payments. Thus for a given time interval, say
a quarter,6.Rwould be the balance of payments
in a given quarter, 6.B the change in the mone-
tary base in that quarter and 6.D the change in
domestic assets held by the central bank. If the
monetary authorities have complete control over
D, the domestic asset component of the mone-
tary base-for example, through control over
open market operations or lending to commer-
cial banks-they may attempt to offset move-
ments in the foreign-exchange-reserve compo-
nent of the monetary base. This would obvi-
9= serial correlation coefficient
D.W. = Durbin-Watson statistic
c = constant term
R' is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
*t-statistics in parentheses
R B D
0.3 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.4 3.3 3.5
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.1 2.0 1.2
0.6 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.7
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.6
0.9 1.1 1.2 5.1 4.1 4.7 4.9
2.0 1.8 3.0 4.1 4.4 3.9 3.8
3.9 2.7 8.5 12.6 17.2 25.1 24.0
2.3 2.6 3.2 13.8 16.5 10.2 11.3
0.3 0.3 1.3 3.6 5.1 3.7 3.8
1.5 i.2 2.1 3.0 2.2 2.2 3.2
0.9 0.7 1.1 2.7 5.4 4.9 3.6
0)
where D domestic assets of the central bank,
R = foreign assets of the central bank
(usually denominated in dollars)
B = monetary base of the central bank (cen-
tralbankmoney).
Themonetary base (B) is linked to the domestic
moneysupply (M) bythe relationship
(2) M mB
where m is the money multiplier, which can be
decomposed into its components which reflect
financial preferences of the public and the bank-
ing system.
Consider a change in equation (l), that is
(3) 6.D+6.R=6.B
or































































































ously imply a negative correlation between 6D terpretations presented above.
and6R. Table 3 indicates that for the period 19661
The causal relation could work in the other to 19731V, the change in the domestic compo-
direction. That is, capital flows may offset the nent of the monetary base of eleven industrial
conscious central bank decision regarding the countries was very significantly and negatively
desired change in D, the domestic component related to the movement in their foreign com-
of the monetary base. Assume, for example, ponent. The overall goodness of fit in these
that the monetary authorities decide not to sat- simple regressions is generally very good, in
isfy all the apparent demand for money. This most cases explaining over 70 percent of the
would imply that the increase in the domes- variation in the change in the domestic com-
tic component of the monetary base would be ponent of the eleven foreign monetary bases. In
sufficient to satisfy only part of the demand for several cases also, the coefficients on the change
money, driving up domestic interest rates. The in the foreign-asset portion of the respective
resulting increase in interest rate differentials, monetary bases are very close to unity. This
however, would cause the excess demand for gives the optimistic impression, if we take these
money to be satisfied from abroad through an regressions at face value, that foreign monetary
induced capital inflow and a balance of pay- authorities were able, within a quarter, to offset
ments surplus. In this case the balance of pay- a very substantial portion of the change in their
ments would reflect the fact that domestic money monetary bases induced by balance-of-pay-
demand exceeded domestic money supply. ments movements. However if we reverse the
When the excess demand for money was satis- relationship, explaining the change in the for-
fied the balance of payments would revert back eign component, we obtain very similar re-
to zero. Thus a negative relationship between sults, indicating that changes in the domestic
6R and 6D is consistent with either of the in- component of the base give rise to offsetting
Table 4
Dependent Variable liM (Change in Money Supply) Sample Period 1966-1 - 1973-IV
Country T-Bill Rate lIU.S. Base DUM SPEC
U.K. -80.8449 163.926 102.087 141.445
(-4.46) (2.51) (.623) (1.20)
-.1381 .4520 -.3127 -.597
(2.76) (2.87) (-.835) (-2.48)
288.302 378.412 -300.803 511.224
(3.86) (1.50) (-.728) (1.30)
-.4410 2.6359 1.4270 -3.3346
(-1.74) (2.75) (.494) (-2.01)
-554.445 118.114 -4705.2 213.613
(-2.17) (.566) (-11.029) (.580)
(-.58895) 3.2251 8.7882 4.6724
(-1.18) (2.15) (2.13) (1.30)
-.02342 .01319 -.23557 .23268
(-.783) (.300) (-2.66) (2.84)
-.15157 .71778 -1.1637 -1.1910
(-2.12) (3.69) (-2.52) (-3.75)
-.009529 .096892 -.43853 .11949





**Interest rates = 3-mo. Euro. dollar rate.D.W. Q c SPEC DUM rT.BILLS 6Base Country
movements in the foreign component. Thus,
we cannot infer to what extent central banks
were successful in offsetting foreign-exchange
flows by simply observing the high correlation
between the domestic and foreign components
of the monetary base. We need additional in-
formation to determine the direction of causal-
ity.
variables.
1 The change in the U.S. monetary
base is statistically significant in the majority of
cases. U.S. monetary base changes should not
be consistently significant for nations which were
successful in repelling dollar inflows throughout
this period, a period in which there was a sharp
upward increase in the trend rate of growth in
the U.S. monetary base.
Our results suggest that changes in the U.S.
If foreign central banks during the 1966-73 monetary base significantly influenced the mon-
period were indeed capable of sterilizing for- ey supplies of most major industrial countries ex-
eign-exchange influences on their monetary cept Japan. If the equations in Table 4 are
bases, we should not expect changes in the appended to include changes in foreign as well
monetary base of the United States, the country as U.S. monetary bases, the U.S. base still re-
to which other countries pegged their exchange mains significant. In several cases-the U.K.,
rate for much of the sample period, to strongly Canada, and France in particular-the foreign
influence those foreign money supplies. Yet country's monetary base fails to be significantly
this is not the case. Table 4 relates the change significant (Table 5). These results would in-
in the money supplies of eleven industrial coun- dicate that foreign countries were less than com-
tries to their own short-term interest rate; the pletely successful in sterilizing the foreign in-
change in the U.S. monetary base (measured in fluence on their monetary bases and money
U.S. dollars), a constant and several dummy supplies.
Table 5
Dependent Variable = 6M (change in money supply) Sample Period 1966-1 - 1973-IV
6U.S.*
Base
U.K. .0854 -84.43 155.12 141.263 130.941 543.992 -.019 .5023 2.01
(.28) (3.56) (2.04) (.63) (1.07) (2.85) (-.107)
Canada 1.0794 -.1307 .3618 -.0371 -.6314 .6237 -.336 .4468 2.13
(1.43) (2.84) (2.16) (.09) (2.83) (1.71) (-1.95)
Italy 1.5611 188.966 317.959 -487.583 377.916 -722.835 -.521 .6641 2.17
(4.02) (3.12) (1.68) (1.56) (1.28) (2.53) (-3.35)
Germany .3944 -.3896 1.6937 2.0224 -4.00 1.0712 -.506 .4083 2.32
(3.15) (1.88) (2.00) (.83) (2.91) (.84) (-3.21)
Japan 1.0119 -453.401 123.333 -475377 94.4863 3014.66 .429 .8728 1.78
(1.89) (1.99) (.61) (11.35) (.26) (2.20) (2.60)
France** -.10863 -.63288 2.9810 10.294 4.8985 5.3583 1229 .2544 2.03
(-.763) (-1.13) (1.84) (2.45) (1.26) (1.04) (.678)
Australia .5351 -.0196 .0058 -.2103 .1829 .1579 -.057 .6509 2.04
(3.20) (.85) (. i7) (2.67) (2.69) (1.57) (-.312)
Netherlands .7161 -.1124 .6402 -.9163 -I.1661 .4525 .051 .8034 1.99
(6.10) (1.98) (4.39) (2.62) (4.69) (1.24) (.277)
Sweden .60767 .003736 .03947 -.53809 .07778 .14435 -.5783 .3759 2.25
(2.03) (.183) (.485) (-3.41) (.513) (.758) (-3.88)
Norway** .3976 .07349 .4218 -.2552 -.6275 -.038 .321 I 2.23
(1.68) (2.94) (3.88) (-1.35) (-2.49) (-2.28)
Denmark** .2635 -.01434 .4568 .7267 .2805 -.041 .0839 2.16
(.71 I) (-.174) (1.29) (1.19) (.337) (-2.48)
*U.S. Base measured in U.S. dollars.
**r = 3-mo. Euro-dollar rate.
SPEC = dummy variable for periods 1972IY-197311. 45Itshould notbe surprising to find that changes
in the U.S. monetary base were significant in
explaining changes in foreign money supplies.
Given the commitment by most nations to a sys-
tem of fixed exchange rates, and given the con-
tinual rise in the rate of growth of the U.S.
monetary base (from 2.0 percent in 1959-62 to
8.1 percent in 1973) it was not simply chance
that most industrial nations experienced rapid
increases in the rates of growth of their money
supplies. The evidence seems to indicate that
while these nations in the short run could steri-
lize some of the undesired increase in the mone-
tary base induced via the balance of payments,
they could not achieve long-run sterilization.
Academic opinion also shifted during this pe-
riod, bringing on a revival of primarily monetary
interpretations of balance-of-payments phenom-
ena. To that subjectwe now turn.
Money and the balance of payments
In its most rudimentary form, a monetary in-
terpretation of the balance of payments requires
a money demand equation, a money supply
equation, an equation positing the equality of
money demand and money supply (that is,
money market equilibrium) and lastly, an equa-
tion defining the balance of payments as the
change in the foreign asset component of the
monetary base. The balance of payments,
either through the flow of goods or the flow of
capital, augments or diminishes the stock of
foreign-exchange reserves of a nation, and hence
the nation's monetary base. In equilibrium the
demand for money must equal the supply, thus
the balance of payments must also be zero. If
the balance of payments is in surplus there must
be excess demand for money; if it is in deficit,
there is an excess supply of money. The balance
of payments is the mechanism through which
equality of money demand and supply is
achieved.
The thing to be emphasized in this interpreta-
tion is that a non-zero balance of payments is a
disequilibrium phenomenon. Variations in the
balance of payments represent the flood gates
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through which equilibrium in the money mar-
ket is restored. What then determines whether
a country will have an excess demand or excess
supply ofmoney?
The functional components of the monetary
base demand and supply determine the balance
of payments and, simultaneously, the existence
of excess demand or supply in the money mar-
ket. Note that when we refer to "money" here
we are referring to the monetary base. However,
since money used by the public-say, demand
deposits plus currency-is institutionally linked
to the monetary base, our analysis implicitly
concerns the excess demand and supply of mon-
ey in the hands of the public.
Table 6
Dependent Variable = log (Monetary Base)
Sample Period = 1966-1 - 1973-IV
log Y log r c Q R2 D.W.
------
U.S. .8409 -.0424 -1.368 .2192 .9907 1.97
(39.1) (-3.00) (-9.44) (1.67)
U.K. .6692 .1880 .5616 .6270 .9628 1.88
(9.78) (4.54) (.749) (4.41)
Canada 1.0625 -.0443 -3.0014 .8548 .9937 2.03
(12.0) (-1.87) (-7.38) (9.02)
Italy .2063 -.0441 7.6100 .9662 .9937 1.90
(3.16) (-1.04) (9.94) (20.5)
Germany 1.3358 -.01758 -4.5014 .7901 .9793 2.31
(8.33) (-.348) (-4.38) (7.06)
Japan 1.2418 .09842 -7.1474 .8155 .9975 2.25
(2l.5) (1.34) (-9.48) (7.72)
France -.1085 .1135 ,. 5.7253 .9740 .9503 2.00
(-.784) (1.95) (5.22) (23.5)
Australia 1.0918 -.0544 -2.6408 .8136 .9902 1.84
(11.4) (-.874) (-8.60) (7.66)
Netherlands .4864 -.0690 .1567 .3483 .9625 2.03
(17.3) (-4.55) (1.15) (2.03)
Swedent .7898-.04780-1.4830 .4014 .9766 1.73
(17.7) (-2.22) (-6.87) (2.06)
Norway .7592 -.0569":....00550 .2550 .9683 1.94
(21.9) (-2.39) (-.056) (1.41)
Denmark .1636 .09161 * 1.0352 .8065 .7677 1.84
(.807) (I.10) (1.06) (7.47)
tFor period 1966.1-1971.4 r domestic short-term interest rate
*3-mo. Euro-dollar rate y aggregate output (GNP or GOP)*The critical value ofthe F-statistic at the 99% confidence
level is 4.31 for all except Sweden.
Testsconductedby splitting sample pound in halfandtest-
ing for statistical changesoverthe two sub-sample periods.
Base money demand can be simply stated as
a function of aggregate income and some sum-
mary measure of interest rates. Base money sup-
ply is composed of a domestic credit component
which is determined by the central bank, and a
foreign asset componentfor the non-reserve cen-
ter country. The domestic component of the
monetary base may be thought of as the variable
the monetary authorities control in order to in-
fluence domestic credit market conditions and
the public's holdings of money. The primary
means by which the monetary authorities con-
trol this domestic component vary from country
to country, some using discount-rate policy,
others open market operations or reserve re-
quirements.
Consider an example where we begin with the
equalityofbase money demand andsupply. The
balance of payments is zero. (Recall that we
are assuming a world with imperfectly flexible
exchange rates.) The central bank, desiring to
achieve some income orinterest rate or even bal-
ance-of-payments objective (the objective is of
little significance), increases the domestic com-
ponent of the monetary base. There now exists
an excess supply of base money. The increase
in base money, operating through central-bank
domestic credit operations, will result in a fall
Table 7
Tests of Stability Of Regression Coefficients




























in domestic interest rates and a rise in income
generating a capital outflow and a trade deficit.
The consequent decrease in international re-
serves will then offset the increase of domestic
credit on the monetary base. When, after some
period of time, equilibrium is restored to the
money market, it will have been achieved
through the avenue of the balance of payments.
Indeed, the decline in the country's reserve hold-
ings would be exactly equal to the conscious in-
crease in the domestic component of the mone-
tary base.
Ultimately, then, the money supply of the
country under consideration does not change.
However, what does increase is the world money
stock, for now other countries hold the reserves
that were lost by the domestic-credit-expanding
nation. 2 A non-reserve center country can de-
termine the composition of its monetary base,
but its total monetary base and money supply
are determined by their interactions with other
countries-thus, its money supply becomes an
endogenous variable, rather than a variable de-




As we normally think of an aggregate demand
for money by the public as a function of income,
interest rates and other explanatory variables,
we can similarly conceive of a demandfor mone-
tary base. The demand for monetary base
money can be thought of as a "derived demand,"
in the sense that it derives from the demand for
money held by the public. This derived demand
for monetary base also relates to the stability
of the multiplier connecting the monetary
base to the money supply used by the public,
this multiplier capturing a large number of mon-
ey and reserve preferences of the public and the
banking system.
The statistical validity of the monetary theory
of the balance of payments depends crucially
onthe stability ofits underlying behavioralequa-
tions-inits most rudimentary form, the demand
and supply functions for monetary base. We
will consider here only the demand for monetaryIh,edlerrwnd for monetary base was spe-
functiclfl of th~ levelof ~ggregate
most cases,gross dom~~stjlc
in others-and a representative
~hort-term interestrate (r). A log-form demand
~quationwas estimated for eleven countries,
\Vitl1the results appearing in Table 6. The re-
sUlts for Italy, France and Denl1l.ark were poor,
in the sense that the.coefficient on the income
;lBf'mwas either extremely small,statistically in-
significant, or both..... However, these fesults
should be. discounted tosome extent because we
did not have quarterly GDP data fOf those and
several other countries, so. that quartedy data'
wefe generated by inte~polating from annual n'l';'
gressionsof GDP(jl1retail sales and industdal
production, wl'fighted by prices.
For th~;remaining monetary base demand
equati(l;l.1s, we found that the coefficients on the
. incOme and interest-rate variable were not very
different from those found for demand equations
for money held by the public (demand deposits
and currency). Income elasticities, measured
by the coefficient on the aggregate-output vari-
able, were in most cases between 0.75 and 1.25,
about what would be expected a priori. The
coefficient on the interest fate variable was gen-
efally negative (as expected) but positive and
significant in the cas~ of the U.K. For the ma-
jority of cases, the elasticity of base-money de-
mandwith fespect to interest rates wa~ felatively
small, a result not atypi~~l of those seen for the
dyPlal1d for money helel by the public.
To test the stability of the Plonetary base de-
mand equations, the sample period was divided
eveplyand separate regressions were estimated
over these subsample periods. The conventional
F-testforstability of the eqllati9n overthe entire
sample period Was performed, as seen in Tabl~
7. Regressions were also run llsing multiplica:
tive and additive dummy variables in addition
to the original.explanatory variables, permitting
us to test shifts in a particular coefficient. These
fegressions (not reported here) show~d
significant differences in the income elasticity of
Illonetary base demand between the periods
1966,.69 and 1970-73 for Canad~, France, Ger,.
and inparticulaf about the
data, the n~1rti~rlhJ
thehypothesis th~t monetary
tions remained stable over
Monetary.theories of the balall(:~
afe essentially;theories of equilibrium restofa-
tioll between money demand and supply in open
eoonomies. As we have seen, this analysis
hinges cfUcially on the empirical stability of
monetary-base demand. Our analysis thus lends
empirical support to monetary intefpn~tationsof
balance-of-payments phenomena.
Conclusion
The monetary theory of the balance of pay-
ments has revived interest in explaining balance
of payments phenomena by concentratingonthe
means by which equilibrium between demand
and supply for money is achieved under a sys-
tem of less than pedectly floating exchange
rates. In addition, it has emphasized the rela-
tionship between domestic credit creation by a
central bank and the simultaneous creation of
world" money-those international resefves the
domesticcfedit expanding country loses which
are absorbedbythe rest of the world. This paper
concludes that there is some statistical evidence
to supportsuch interpfetations.
FOOTNOTES
The' dummy variable SPEC is unity for the period
1972.4-1973.2. The dummy variable DUM is different for
different countries; for example, it is unity for the period
of the French civil turmoil in 1968.2.
2. As Michael Keranhas shown in his article, the world
stock of forei~nexchange reserves, one measure of a.world
mgnllY'stock, contributed significantly to the increase in
world prices in the last several years.
3. This poi~t is dllv;eloped in thll companion article. by
Edward S. Shaw.
4. Tn most cases monetary-base data were obtained from
the}MF'SlIltlfrnational Financial Statistics, and were sea-
. ~on~nYadjustlldusing thllCensus X-ll program.
48